ALJDEC decisions subject to certification as final

20F-AAA1920002-ADH-RES · Arizona State Department of Housing · 2020-03-23

IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

Peter and Monica Blomquist,

Appellants,

vs.

Arizona Department of Housing,

Appellee.

No. 20F-AAA1920002-ADH-RES

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

HEARING: March 5, 2020, at 9:00 a.m.

APPEARANCES: Peter and Monica Blomquist (“Appellants”) appeared on their own behalf; the Arizona Department of Housing (“the Department”) was represented by Valerie Love Marciano, Esq., Assistant Attorney General.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Diane Mihalsky

_____________________________________________________________________

FINDINGS OF FACT

Background and Procedure

On or about August 20, 2019, Appellants filed a complaint with the Department against Yvette Rickards DBA Yvette’s Home Sales, alleging that she had converted to her own use funds that they had paid to purchase a Chariot Eagle, serial number CEWIPAZ1119083296, in relevant part as follows:

We contracted to purchase this home with Yvette’s Home Sales on 11/12/19 with a $1,000 down payment. We paid the balance of $37,000 on 11/29/18. We were never able to get the title from Yvette and we were never able to recover our $38,000. We did later purchase the home directly from the sellers. Yuma County has all of our documentation concerning our complaints and loss of a total of $38,000.00.

Appellants stated on the complaint that the Chariot Eagle was in the Shangri La RV Resort in Yuma, Arizona, and attached to the complaint documents concerning their purchase, including (1) A Personal Property Purchase and Sales Agreement dated February 15, 2019, between Appellants and Anthony or Sharon Aiello for a 2009 Cavco 11x35 trailer located on Space 73 of the Shangri La RVP; (2) Appellants’ personal check dated November 12, 2018, made payable to Yvette’s Home sales in the amount of $1,000.00 for “Park Model #73”; and Appellant’s November 29, 2018 check to Yvettte’s Home Sales in the amount of $37,000.00 for “Park Model #73.”

On or about August 22, 2019, the Department’s Complaints Manager, Esperanza Z. Padilla, set a letter to Appellants, declining to investigate their complaint, in relevant part as follows:

[The Department] recently reviewed your complaint filed on or about August 20, 2019 against Yvette Sarma Reckards dba Yvette’s Home Sales. The unit listed in the complaint is a 2009, 11x35, Chariot Eagle. This size and manufacturer categorizes the unit as a park trailer. This Department does not have statutory authority over park trailers; therefore, the Department is unable to assist you.

On or about September 16, 2019, the Department received Appellant’s appeal of the Department’s August 22, 2019 letter, stating that “[w]e feel the [Department] has wrongly denied out complaint due to the wording in the law, A.R.S.41-4043(A) (B).” Appellants filed a second complaint that included additional information, but no additional documentation, with a letter stating that “Per Cavco Incorporated, park models are made with the same materials and in the same factory as “manufactured homes." Appellants sent a third letter to the Department that stated in relevant part as follows:

We filed for restitution with the [Department] regarding our loss of $38,000 and were denied. We are appealing the decision. The loss was from a payment we made to Yvette Reckards, Yvette’s Home Sales, to purchase the home. It is documented by Yuma County that Yvette used our money to gamble at Casinos.

We were denied compensation by the [Department] because the agency says they do not provide restitution for “park trailers” . . . . But the [Department] does provide compensation for “manufactured homes, mobile homes, or factory-built buildings designed for use as a residential building.” . . .

We contest that our home is not considered a “factory-built building designed for use as a residential building” by the [Department]. This home is 612 square feet plus an additional 220 square feet in the second story. It was originally built in a manufactured home factory – 374 square feet with an additional 220 square feet in the second story, but when delivered to the building site, a permanent addition was added and the home is 612 square feet plus 220 square feet in the second story. A park model, by definition, is less than 400 square feet, therefore this home should not be considered a park model.

Yvette Reckards used her Arizona State issued license (#8660) to convince us to give her the $38,000 telling us she was insured by the State of Arizona. She was allowed by the State of Arizona to sell park models using her license. Because the state insured Yvette and her license, and Yvette used her license in dealing with us we feel we are entitled to restitution from the Recovery Fund.

The Department referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency, for an evidentiary hearing.

A hearing was held on March 5, 2020. The Department submitted six exhibits and presented the testimony of three witnesses: (1) The Department’s Licensing and Investigation Section Manager/Manufactured Housing, Donna Grant; (2) Ms. Padilla; and (3) Sean Ryan Paris, the Department’s ISA Liaison, who inspected and prepared a report of his inspection of Appellants’ Chariot Eagle trailer. Appellants submitted seven exhibits and testified on their own behalf.

/ / / /

Applicable Law

The Arizona legislature created the Department in Chapter 37 of Arizona Revised Statutes Title 41, A.R.S. §§ 41-3951 to 41-4065. Article 3 of Chapter 37, A.R.S. §§ 41-4001 to 41-4010, creates the Department’s Office of Manufactured Housing. The Arizona legislature enacted Article 3 in 2016.

A.R.S. § 41-4002 provides the purpose of the Department’s Office of Manufactured Housing, in relevant part as follows:

The purpose of the office of manufactured housing within the department is to maintain and enforce standards of quality and safety for manufactured homes, factory-built buildings, mobile homes and accessory structures and installation of manufactured and mobile homes, factory-built buildings and accessory structures. The affairs of the office of manufactured housing shall be conducted consistently with minimum standards of the United States department of housing and urban development [“HUD”] . . . .

(Emphases added.)

A.R.S. § 41-4001 provides defines certain terms in statutes providing the purpose and authority of the Department’s Office of Manufactured Housing, including the following:

2. "Act" means the national manufactured housing construction and safety standards act of 1974 and title VI of the housing and community development act of 1974 (P.L. 93-383, as amended by P.L. 95-128, 95-557, 96-153 and 96-339). .

17. "Factory-built building":

(a) Means a residential or commercial building that is:

(i) Either wholly or in substantial part manufactured using closed construction at an off-site location and transported for installation or completion, or both, on-site.

(ii) Constructed in compliance with adopted codes, standards and procedures.

(iii) Installed temporarily or permanently.

(b) Does not include a manufactured home, recreational vehicle, panelized commercial building using open construction, panelized residential building using open or closed construction or domestic or light commercial storage building.

. . . .

25. "Manufactured home" means a structure built in accordance with the act.

. . . .

27. "Mobile home" means a structure built before June 15, 1976, on a permanent chassis, capable of being transported in one or more sections and designed to be used with or without a permanent foundation as a dwelling when connected to on-site utilities. Mobile home does not include recreational vehicles and factory-built buildings.

. . . .

33. "Recreational vehicle" means a vehicular type unit that is:

. . . .

(c) A park trailer built on a single chassis, mounted on wheels and designed to be connected to utilities necessary for operation of installed fixtures and appliances and has a gross trailer area of not less than three hundred twenty square feet and not more than four hundred square feet when it is set up, except that it does not include fifth wheel trailers.

. . . .

40. "Unit" means a manufactured home, mobile home, factory-built building or accessory structures.

(Footnote and emphases added.)

A.R.S. § 41-4004 sets forth the powers and duties of the Department with respect to the Office of Manufactured Housing, including the following:

9. Verify written complaints filed with the office by purchasers within one year after the date of purchase or installation of units. Complaints shall be accepted from consumers that allege violations by any dealer, broker, salesperson, installer or manufacturer of this chapter or the rules adopted pursuant to this chapter.

10. On verification of a complaint pursuant to paragraph 9 of this subsection, serve notice to the dealer, broker, salesperson, installer or manufacturer that such verified complaint shall be satisfied as specified by the office.

(Emphasis added.)

A.R.S. § 41-4043 allows consumers who have been damaged by licensed dealers’ sales of regulated units to recover damages from the Department’s Consumer Recovery Fund, in relevant part as follows:

A. If any consumer who is buying or selling the consumer's home uses the services of a licensed dealer of manufactured homes, mobile homes or factory-built buildings designed for use as residential buildings and is damaged as a result of an act or omission by a licensed dealer of manufactured homes, mobile homes or factory-built buildings designed for use as residential buildings that constitutes a violation of section 41-4030, or rules adopted pursuant to that section, and the sale is subject to section 41-4030, subsection D, that consumer may file a claim with the department for payment from the consumer recovery fund. The claim shall be verified by the department.

B. If any consumer of manufactured homes, mobile homes or factory-built buildings designed for use as residential buildings is damaged by the failure of the principal to perform a sales agreement or to perform repairs under a warranty the consumer may file a claim with the department for payment from the consumer recovery fund. The claim shall be verified by the department.

(Emphases added.)

Chapter 19 of Arizona Revised Statutes Title 33, A.R.S. §§ 33-2191 to 33-2151, is entitled Recreational Vehicle Long-Term Rental Space Act. A.R.S. § 33-2102 provides the following definitions:

5. "Factory-built building" means a residential or nonresidential building, including a dwelling unit or habitable room of the building, that is either wholly or in substantial part manufactured at an off-site location to be assembled on site, except that it does not include a manufactured home, recreational vehicle or mobile home as defined in section 41-4001.

. . . .

9. "Mobile home" means either of the following:

(a) A residential structure that was manufactured on or before June 15, 1976, that is transportable in one or more sections, eight feet or more in body width, over thirty feet in body length with the hitch, built on an integral chassis, designed to be used as a dwelling when connected to the required utilities and not originally sold as a travel trailer or recreational vehicle and that includes the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and electrical systems in the structure.

(b) A manufactured home built after June 15, 1976, originally bearing an appropriate insignia of approval issued by the United States department of housing and urban development.

. . . .

18. "Recreational vehicle" means a vehicular type unit that is any of the following:

. . . .

(c) A park trailer or park model built on a single chassis, mounted on wheels or originally mounted on wheels and from which the wheels have been removed and designed to be connected to utilities necessary for operation of installed fixtures and appliances and has a gross trailer area of not less than three hundred twenty square feet and not more than four hundred square feet when it is set up, except that it does not include fifth wheel trailers.

(Emphases added.)

The Department does not regulate long-term rental of recreational vehicle spaces, although it does regulate mobile home parks under the Arizona Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, A.R.S. §§ 33-1401 to 33-1501. See A.R.S. §§ 41-4061 to 41-4065 (“Mobile Home Parks Administrative Hearings”).

Hearing Evidence

Ms. Blomquist testified that their unit has 540 square feet and is not a park model. They wrote “park model” on the check to Yvette’s Home Sales because that was what was on the contract and that was what she required. Appellants testified that they paid Yvette’s Home Sales a total of $38,000.00. Appellants pointed out that Yvette’s Home Sales included its license number on the receipt that Ms. Reckards gave them for their payment. Appellants testified that they would not have given so much money to Ms. Reckards if she had not been licensed.

Appellants testified that they had started repainting and otherwise moving into the home immediately after the sale. Appellants testified that the former owners of the home, Mr. and Mrs. Aiello, did not transfer title to them immediately upon the sale because they did not trust Ms. Reckards. Appellants submitted Yvette’s Home Sales’ January 8, 2019 check to Mr. and Mrs. Aiello in the amount of $36,480.00, which was the cost of the home, less Ms. Reckards’ commission.

Mr. Blomquist testified that Yvette’s Home Sales’ bank later dishonored the check made payable to Mr. and Mrs. Aiello and that Appellants were forced to pay Mr. and Mrs. Aiello again to obtain title to the home. The Department submitted a printout of the Arizona Mobile Home Record, which showed that title to an 11x35 Chariot Eagle was transferred to Appellants on February 14, 2019.

Mrs. Blomquist explained that they waited until August 26, 2019, to file a complaint against Yvette Reckards with the Department because it was not until then that she plead guilty to criminal charges against her had been filed in Yuma for her conversion of more than $300,000 that she and her husband, Michael Reckards, had received from sixteen sets of homebuyers, including Appellants. Appellants explained that, although the Reckards had been ordered to pay restitution upon their release from prison, Appellants would be in their 80’s by that time.

Mr. Blomquist testified that some of the other homebuyers whom the Reckards defrauded were able to recover their damages from the Department’s Consumer Recovery Fund. Their home was custom built and came from the factory with a 8’ header that allowed an addition to be constructed. Appellants testified that they believed that their home was either a manufactured home, a factory-built building, or a mobile home under the Department’s statutes.

Ms. Grant testified that, before she worked for the Department, she worked 35 years for the Arizona Department of Life, Building, & Fire Safety (‟BFS‟). Between December 16, 1986, and June 30, 2016, BFS had jurisdiction over licensed RV dealers. After June 30, 2016, the Department assumed many of BFS’ statutory responsibilities, including over licensed dealers of factory-built buildings, manufactured homes, and mobile homes. In 2016, the Department issued License No. 8660-D to Yvette Reckards, which enabled her to lawfully sell factory-built buildings, manufactured homes, and mobile homes to the public.

Ms. Grant testified that the Department received numerous consumer complaints that Ms. Reckards failed to pay the proceeds from or taxes on her sales of mobile or manufactured homes or to provide warranties for the homes she sold. Ms. Grant noted that A.R.S. § 41-4002 gave the Department jurisdiction over the sales of manufactured homes, factor-built buidings, and mobile homes.

Ms. Grant testified that A.R.S. § 41-4001(17)(a)(i) – (iii) defined a factory-built building as a building that had been constructed wholly or in substantial part using closed construction, in compliance with adopted codes, standards and procedures. Ms. Grant noted that A.R.S. § 41-4001(17)(b) specifically excluded a recreational vehicle (“RV”) from the definition of a factory-built building.

Ms. Grant noted that A.R.S. § 41-4001(25) defined manufactured home as a structure that had been built according to regulations adopted by HUD. A.R.S. § 41-4001(27) defined a mobile home as a structure built before June 15, 1976, excluding RVs.

Ms. Grant testified that A.R.S. § 41-4001(33)(c) defined an RV.as a park trailer that had between 320 and 400 square feet when it was set up. Ms. Grant testified that the Department measures the size of an RV when it leaves the factory.

Ms. Grant testified that the Department did not license Ms. Reckards as a dealer of RVs under the statutes creating the Department and setting forth its regulatory authority. The Department issued an emergency order revoking Ms. Reckard’s license on February 1, 2019, and had paid approximately $274,400 to consumers who had been damaged by Ms. Reckards’ dealings in manufactured and mobile homes.

Ms. Grant testified that Appellants’ home was not a mobile home because it had been manufactured in 2009. The home was not a manufactured home because it had not been built to HUD regulations and did not have a HUD label. It was not a factory-built building because it had not been constructed according to the factory-built building codes.

Ms. Grant testified that, therefore, Appellants’ home was a park trailer RV over which the Department lacked jurisdiction. RVs were governed by the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) standards.

Ms. Padilla testified that she reviewed Appellants’ complaint. Ms. Padilla testified that the Appellant’s February 15, 2019 agreement with the Aiellos and the title provided 11x35 as the trailer’s dimensions, which meant that it had 378 square feet of space when it left the factory, which made it a park trailer. Yvette’s Mobile Home Sales’ receipts and Appellants’ checks described the trailer as a park model. Ms. Padilla determined to deny Appellants’ complaint under A.R.S. § 41-4001(33)(C) because Appellants’ home was a park trailer over which the Department had no jurisdiction. Ms. Grant stated that she reviewed Ms. Padilla’s August 22, 2019 letter denying Appellants’ complaint before it was sent

On or about September 13, 2019, Ms. Grant sent an email to the manager of the Shangri La RV Resort in Yuma, Arizona, in relevant part as follows:

Please confirm by email that Shangri-La RV Park is a recreational vehicle park for park trailers (also referred to as park models) and that this community does not also include rental spaces for manufactured homes or mobile homes.

If the park does include rental spaces for manufactured homes or mobile homes, please confirm by email that the unit located in space 73 is a park trailer (also referred to as a park model). . . .

On that same date, the manager responded, in relevant part as follows:

Yes I can confirm that Shangri-Law RV Resort is a recreational vehicle park for park trailers and does not include rental spaces for manufactured homes or mobile homes.

The unit on site 73 is a park model . . . .

Mr. Paris inspected and measured Apellants’ home on January 13, 2020. He reported in relevant part as follows:

I visited the home and took pictures of unit. Measured the unit. The unit measured from outside of unit 35 foot 6 inch lenth and 11 foot 5 inch width. From the interior of unit 34 foot 7 inch length 10 foot 5 inch width. The home owner was on site and pointed out a loft area that was approximately 22 ft in length by 10 ft 5 inch in width, by 4 ft 6 inch tall headroom. There is a self-supporting addition that has been placed on the Southside of unit. No HUD Tags were locatable on the UNIT it self [sic]. . . . The homeowner pointed out the new additional areas and these were very visable within the home. The additions were not included in the upper measurements. After review of the unit[, t]he square footage calculation is approximately 373 square footage.

. . . .

Determination of what unit appears to be. The loft area having a headroom height of 4 foot 6 inchs [sic] tall, does not meet the HUD code requirement 3280.104 of the 7ft height for a minimum of 50 percent of the rooms floor area, to be considered square footage. So the loft area cannot be considered square footage. The unit appears to have been built under a different code other than the HUD 3280 code. As there is a loft area that does not meet HUD Code, there [are] sleeping areas that do not meet egress requirements in the loft areas etc. At this point I would not consider this unit to be a Manufactured HUD home. At this point I have also found that I would not consider this unit to be a Mobile home since the frame rails and the Unit itself appear, from my experience to be built after June 1976. That leaves the unit to [be] presented as a Park trailer. Note from the exterior, and underbelly of the unit, and with my experience of viewing park trailers, this unit would be classified as a Park Trailer.

The Department submitted seventeen photographs that Mr. Paris had taken of Appellant’s home. Mr. Park testified that the original trailer is behind a V-shaped roofline at the front, with a dormer where the loft was located. The main door into the home was located in the addition. An additional door was located in the front or south side of the addition. Mr. Paris testified that the addition had been constructed with wood on a metal frame, like a site-built home.

Mr. Paris also photographed the loft area, which he testified was not habitable under HUD regulations because it was only 4’6” high. Mr. Paris photographed the stairway as well, and testified that he had access concerns because the stairwell to the loft was not up to HUD regulations or the International Residential Code (“IRC”). Mr. Paris testified that the loft could not be considered as habitable area under the HUD regulation, which governs manufactured homes, IRC Code R305.1, which governs factory-built buildings or modular homes, or even the ANSI code, which governs RVs, due to the low ceiling.

Mr. Blomquist testified that the addition was not new because it had been constructed immediately after the home was brought to Shangri La RV Park. Mr. Blomquist testified that the original owners of the home, Mr. and Mrs. Gaines, ordered the home to be custom-built in the factory so that the addition could be constructed and did not move into the home until the addition was complete.

Mr. Blomquist testified that he had searched inside the cabinets and did not find a HUD tag on his home, but that did not mean the tag had not been there. It could have been removed or painted over by a previous owner. Appellants submitted a photograph of the windows in the loft with a label that read “Exit” on the sill. The did not cite any codes or regulations that stated that the affixing of such a label satisfied code or regulation requirements for egress.

Applicants submitted a letter from Chris Karvoski, the president of Superior Awnings Inc., which had constructed the addition. Mr. Karoski stated that he measured the original factory-built home at 11’6” x 34’10”, for a total of 400 sq. ft., and that the addition measured 7’ x 20’, for a total of 140 sq. ft., which made the total square footage in the home 540 sq. ft.

Appellants also submitted the Yuma County permit for the addition dated June 23, 2009, which described a 7x20 room addition, a 7x15 screen room, and a 7x35 deck. Mr. Blomquist testified that the home had been constructed with a 8’ header and an 11’ wide opening to allow the addition to be built immediately after the home was moved to the Shangri La RV Park. The home was designed to have an interior space of 540’.

Mr. Blomquist acknowledged that the second page of the permit described an “11’x34’-10.5” existing park model.”

Appellants also submitted the ADOT Motor Vehicle Division title for their home, which showed the letters “MH” for the body style, but also showed the dimensions 11x35 for the dimensions. Mrs. Blomquist testified that she consulted other licensed dealers and an employee at ADOT, who told her that “MH” stood for manufactured home or mobile home. Mrs. Blomquist testified that “park model” was a generic term that was used in the park where the home had been installed.

Appellants submitted photographs of the underside of their home, which showed that it had been installed on cinderblock pillars and that the wheels and tires had been removed. Mr. Blomquist testified that wheels and tires were customarily removed from manufactured homes when they were permanently installed.

Appellants submitted an excerpt from attorney Michael Parham’s blog that quoted A.R.S. § 42-19151’s definition of a mobile home for purposes of the Arizona tax code for assessing taxes on various kinds of personal property, which set forth the dimensions of more than 8’ in body width and more than 32’ in length or, regardless of size, a structure that was used as a single-family dwelling. Mr. Parham opined that the definition “captures park models, and most other RV’s” and that “[t]ax laws treat residence for more than 30 days as a residential use.”

Appellants submitted an excerpt from the Department’s website that stated that “[t]he Manufactured Housing Division maintains standards of safety for all manufactured homes, factory built buildings and accessory structures. These standards promote the health, safety and welfare of Arizona citizens and are consistent with the [HUD] standards.” Appellants submitted 24 C.F.R. § 3280.2 which stated as follows:

Manufactured home means a structure, transportable in one or more sections, . . . which when erected on-site is 320 or more square feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities . . . .

Mr. Blomquist pointed out that Mr. Paris had measured Appellants’ home at 373 square feet when it had been transported to the site.

Mr. Paris testified that wheels and tires are usually removed from park trailers after they are installed to avoid maintenance issues. Different codes apply to different kinds of manufactured structures: Axles are also removed from manufactured homes. HUD regulations govern manufactured homes; the IRC governs factory-built buidings; and ANSI governs RVs, including park models.

Ms. Grant testified that she studied Cavco’s 302 reports for all the Chariot Eagles manufactured between January 2009, and December 2009. The reports included serial numbers and HUD labels. She did not find that the serial number of Appellants’ home had been reported as a manufactured home or given a HUD label.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A.R.S. § 41-4004(A)(9) requires the Department to verify written complaints against the dealers of personal property that the Department has been authorized by statute to regulate. The Department is reasonably presumed to have certain expertise, experience, and knowledge with respect to those matters the law provides it authority to inspect, because verification upon inspection is a threshold determination by the inspector which then allows the Department to issue an appropriate order pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-4004(A)(10).

Appellants bear the burden to establish that, under applicable statutes, the Department should have investigated their complaint against Yvette Reckards regarding the sale of their home by a preponderance of the evidence.

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of 6’). that the contention is more probably true than not.” A preponderance of the evidence is “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

“[A] statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes to the end that they may be harmonious and consistent; . . . if statutes relate to the same subject and are thus in pari materia, they should be construed together with other related statutes as though they constituted one law.” Statutes are not interpreted in a vacuum and legal relationships mandated by one statute cannot be ignored in interpreting another. An agency may not disregard clear statutory directives or legislative intent. “A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to give full effect to each statutory word or phrase so that no part is rendered void, superfluous, contradictory or insignificant.”

A.R.S. § 41-4001 provides the definitions that determine the scope of the Department’s authority to license and regulate dealers. A.R.S. § 41-4001(25) defines a manufactured home as one that has been built according to HUD standards, it does not incorporate by definition any of HUD’s statutory definitions of similar terms. The definitions set forth in HUD and in statutes governing the Arizona Department of Revenue do not supersede the definitions set forth in A.R.S. § 41-4001 or otherwise expand the Department’s jurisdiction.

Under the definitions set forth A.R.S. § 41-4001, a structure’s character is determined in the factory and cannot be changed by additions built on site after it is delivered. Even if the same factory manufactures RVs as well as manufactured homes, the products must meet statutory definitions for the Department to regulate the sale of such products. Under the definitions set forth in A.R.S. § 41-4001, especially A.R.S. § 41-4001(33)(c), Appellants’ home is a park trailer. A.R.S. § 41-4004 allows the Department to verify complaints against dealers of manufactured homes, mobile homes, and factory-built buildings, but not park trailers, even if the dealer who sold the park trailer is also licensed to sell manufactured homes, mobile homes, and factory-built buildings. Because the Department’s statutes do not authorize it to regulate the sale of park trailers and RVs, the Department does not have jurisdiction over Appellants’ complaint against Yvette Reckards.

If the Department verifies a consumer’s complaint against a dealer based on his or her sale of a manufactured home, mobile home, or factory-built building, the Department may order a payout from the Consumer Recovery Fund. Because the Department does not regulate the sale of park trailers, like the one Yvette Reckards sold Appellants, they are not eligible for a payout to recover any damages that they may have incurred on the sale.

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that, on the effective date of the final order in this matter, AppellantsPeter and Monica Blomquist’s complaint filed with the Arizona Department of Housing shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In the event of certification of the Administrative Law Judge Decision by the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings, the effective date of the Order will be five days from the date of that certification.

Done this day, March 23, 2020.

/s/ Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge

Transmitted electronically to:

Carol Ditmore, Director

Arizona Department of Housing