ALJDEC - Licensing
2022A-06811-CHC-ROC · Registrar of Contractors · 2023-03-06
IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Lawrence Tiffin ,
COMPLAINANT
v.
Fraire Custom Builders LLC
License No. ROC 153006,
RESPONDENT
No. 2022A-06811-CHC-ROC
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
HEARING: December 12, 2022, 1:00 P.M.; January 18, 2023, 9:00 A.M.
APPEARANCES: Complainant Lawrence Tiffin appeared on his own behalf; Jeanna M. W. Chandler, Esq., and Cindy Nguyen, Esq., appeared on behalf of Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Roger A. Geddes
_____________________________________________________________________
FINDINGS OF FACT
Background and Procedure
1. Fraire Custom Builders, LLC (Respondent), is the holder of License Number 153006 issued by the Registrar of Contractors (Registrar).
2. On or about August 8, 2022, Lawrence Tiffin (Complainant) filed a Complaint against Respondent with the Registrar alleging the failure to complete the construction of a garage and living area addition by Respondent at a residence in Tucson, Arizona (“project”). The Complaint reflected a contract amount of $250,000.00 for Phase 1 of the project and $46,000.00 for Phase 2 of the project. (Complainant’s Exhibit E).
3. The Registrar performed an inspection of the project on August 24, 2022. Thereafter, the Registrar issued a Written Directive, dated August 30, 2022, requiring Respondent to complete the work by September 19, 2022 (“Directive expiration”):
Compliance Item: 1 - "Contracted price for the project is $250,000.00.
$247,141.99 paid to date. Contractor refuses to complete further work unless project is de-scoped and addition $80,000 is paid."
Investigator’s Observation: Verified. Respondent has not completed
work in contract for the price specified in the contract or in any modification of the contract. Per respondent, last work completed by respondent was first week of July 2022.
Respondent to complete work per contract.
Governing Rule: Violation of any rule adopted by the Registrar; Namely A.A.C. R4-9-108(a): A contractor shall perform all work in a professional and workmanlike manner.
Failure in a material respect by the licensee to complete a
construction project or operation for the price stated in the
contract, or in any modification of the contract.
4. The Directive also required that Respondent submit an updated version of a contract template to the Registrar that complied with the provisions of A.R.S. § 32-1158.
5. When the Registrar learned that no appreciable work was performed by the Directive expiration, the Registrar then issued a Citation to Respondent, dated September 22, 2022, for the alleged violation of the following:
a. A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(3) (violation of Arizona Administrative Code Rule 4-9-108(a)) for failure to perform work in a professional and workmanlike manner);
b. A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(8) (failure to complete construction project for price stated in contract)
c. A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(12) (violation of A.R.S. § 32-1158(A) for failure to include required information in contract);
6. The Registrar issued a Notice of Hearing, dated November 10, 2022, that set a hearing for December 13, 2022, at 1:00 P.M. The hearing was held on December 13, 2022, and resumed on January 18, 2023. The hearing remained open to permit the parties to submit written closing statements by February 1, 2023, and closing statement responses by February 13, 2023, at which time the hearing was closed.
7. At one or both hearings, Complainant Laurence Tiffin testified on his own behalf; Respondent presented the testimony of Mario Fraire, Luis Morando, Iran Valdez, Miranda Argot, Bob Baughman, Cosme Sauceda, Ed Craddock, Scott Ekstrom, Ramon Torrez, and John Acuna. Arlo Houston, the Registrar Investigator (Investigator) testified on behalf of the Registrar. The Tribunal received and admitted Complainant’s Exhibit Numbers 1 - 18 and Respondent’s exhibit letters A - Q. Complainant’s Exhibit Numbers 19 - 23 submitted on February 1, 2023, after the hearing was concluded and were the subject of Complainant’s February 9, 2023, motion to exclude were not admitted or considered.
8. The Investigator testified on behalf of the Registrar consistently with the Directive and his job inspection notes. Specifically, he testified that he observed that all work per the contract had not been completed. He stated that Respondent advised him that the last work completed under the contract was the first week of July 2022 due to cost overruns and that there were no funds to complete the work. He stated he did a prehearing job inspection on December 7, 2022, and observed that elastomeric coating had been applied and rolled garage doors had been partially installed, but said that the totality of the work was not completed. He further testified that with respect to Respondent’s contract, the items missing were Respondent’s license number, the estimated date of completion, and the notice regarding complaints to the Registrar.
9. As herein relevant to the Citation, Complainant Lawrence Tiffin testified consistent with his timeline of events. (Complainant’s Exhibit B). He testified that the one-page contract between the parties, dated December 20, 2021, was signed on January 6, 2022, for the construction in large part of a garage workshop, bedrooms and family room addition in Phase 1 and a new laundry and guest bathroom for Phase 2. (Complainant’s Exhibit E). He stated Phase 1 was to be paid with a first draw initial deposit of $125,000.00, the second draw of $62,500.00 was to be paid after drywall, the third draw of $37,500.00 was to be paid after paint, and the final draw of $25,000.00 upon completion. The contract reflects no start date or payment schedule for Phase 2, but only that the pricing was not guaranteed after 90 days.
He testified that prior to the second draw, he received a Contractor’s Invoice from Respondent, dated March 11, 2022, in the amount of $34,257.14 which he understood to be an advance for payment of costs so he paid it on March 15, 2022. He stated he then received a Contractor’s Invoice, dated April 7, 2022, invoicing him for the second draw in the amount of $62,500.00 that he paid on April 19, 2022. (Complainant’s Exhibit G). He further stated that although this draw was to be paid after drywall and although drywall was yet to be completed, he was told by Respondent that he had to pay this invoice to keep the job going.
He further testified that he received a Contractor’s Invoice, dated June 28, 2022, for $44,467.00 reflecting the $37,500.00 third draw to be paid after painting and $6,967.00 material cost increase for drywall, block and stucco even though painting had yet to be done. (Complainant’s Exhibit P).
He stated he did not pay the third draw and advised Respondent he would not be paying anything further until Respondent provided an accounting of the job and identified where the money was spent. He testified he had paid Respondent $221,757.14 to date and paid Respondent’s subcontractors $18,029 for work under the contract (excluding add-ons) for a total of $241,647.90. (Complainant’s Exhibit 4). He estimated the cost in excess of $67,000 to complete the work. (Complainant’s Exhibit D). He further testified he did not receive any accounting until after this subject proceeding was commenced, and that Respondent largely stopped work when he refused to pay anything further.
After paying the second draw early, he then received a Contractor’s Invoice, dated June 28, 2022, for the amount of $44,467.00 (Complainant’s Exhibit P), a Proposal dated June 22, 2022, for the amount of $6,312.75 (Respondent’s Exhibit 1), and another Proposal dated July 13, 2022, in the amount of $81,493.71 (Respondent’s Exhibit 2).
10. As herein relevant to the Citation, Mario Fraire, owner of Respondent, testified that he started talking with Complainant in May 2021 when plans were drawn up, submitted the plans in October 2021 that were approved in December 2021, prepared and signed the contract in late December to early January, and started work on January 24, 2022. He stated he bid the job three times and kept reducing the scope of work to achieve a $250,000.00 budget number given to him by Complainant.
He said Complainant modified the contract by adding items to the electric work and insulation, changing the garage door framing, and relocate the bedroom closets. He indicated Phase 1 was not complete regarding the subpanel, the service upgrade, paint, doors, trim and flooring and that Phase 2 was not complete but that the laundry room was completed.
He stated he verbally told Complainant of price increases that he had experienced right away and went over those with Complainant and that they verbally agreed to move up the payment schedule under the contract. He testified he gave Complainant an invoice for extra costs dated March 14, 2022, in the amount of $34,257.14, and that Complainant paid it. (Complainant’s Exhibit F).
He submitted a “Proposal” dated June 22, 2022, for $6,312.75 which he stated was both an invoice and a proposal because the laundry framing, electrical, HVAC, drywall were completed but door and trim, and paint was not, but that Complainant did not sign the proposal or pay the amount. (Complainant’s Exhibit 1). He stated he needed to get the third draw to continue to do work so he submitted a “Contractor’s Invoice,” dated June 28, 2022, in the amount of $44,467.00 representing a request for the third draw and material cost increases, (Complainant’s Exhibit P). He submitted a “Proposal” dated July 13, 2022, for the amount of $81,493.71 for components of Phase 1 and Phase 2 which he stated showed his extra costs but that Complainant did not pay it. (Complainant’s Exhibit 2). He stated that Complainant requested an accounting of the project and that he prepared a budget document, dated August 27, 2022 (Respondent’s Exhibit 9), which he indicated he did not share with Complainant, and then another revised budget document, dated November 17, 2022 (Respondent’s Exhibit 10), which he indicated Complainant declined to review.
11. As herein relevant to the Citation, Luis Morando, the electrical subcontractor on the project, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that his material prices increased since he first bid the job in 2021 and told Fraire he could not do the work for the original price. He stated he did the entire rough-in stage and was paid in full by Respondent but did not get to the trim stage which would have been after painting was completed. He said he did some extra work for Complainant which Complainant paid for directly.
12. As herein relevant to the Citation, Iran Valdez, the concrete subcontractor on the project, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that he did the concrete work for the garage and room addition and did some grading and was paid in full. He stated that concrete prices increased from the time of his original bid and work on the project and that he informed Fraire of that increase. He testified that in bidding, he told Fraire that the extent of the slope might change the price and that when he viewed the site, the slope required additional grading which increased his price. He further testified he finished the demolition of block wall for an additional charge but did not recall the amount but believed it was less than $5,000.00.
13. As herein relevant to the Citation, Miranda Angot, a representative of Kaiser Garage Doors and Gates, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that her company originally bid sectional garage doors which was changed five days later by Fraire to commercial rollup doors. She stated she did not know the cost difference between the doors. She further stated she provided a new bid for doors Complainant had wanted in the amount $10,264.32, but such doors have not been installed.
14. As herein relevant to the Citation, Bob Baughman, the framing subcontractor on the project, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that concerning changes to his work, he stated that there was a change in location of closets but he did not charge Respondent for it. He also testified there was change to the opening of the garage doors, but he did not testify whether or not this caused a change in his price. He stated that to his knowledge, no framing was done on the laundry room. He further testified lumber prices close to tripled during building of structure, but he did not testify whether he passed that cost on to Respondent.
15. As herein relevant to the Citation, Cosme Sauceda, the stucco subcontractor on the project, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that some of his prices doubled and some tripled before he started his work and that he informed Fraire that he would have to increase his price. He did not testify what that increase was but stated he was paid approximately $19,500.00 for the job. He stated Complainant paid him directly to finish the job. He further testified that pop-outs were added to his scope of work, and believed he was paid an additional $1,600.00 from Respondent for that add-on.
16. As herein relevant to the Citation, Ed Craddock, who drafted the plans on the project, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that he was not sure when he started drafting the plans but that the plans were dated October 29, 2021, which included both phases of the project. He stated he did not recall any changes to the plans by Complainant.
17. As herein relevant to the Citation, Scott Ekstrom, the roofing subcontractor on the project, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that he applied a hot asphalt roofing system to the structure which was finished with an elastomeric coating and had been paid in full for the job. He stated he did not finish the job until September 1, 2022, with Complainant because the final coating was not completed until stucco and painting was done. He stated there was a complaint of a leak and believed that it was water coming through scupper even though he had no firsthand knowledge of it. He further testified that he bid the job in November 2021 and stayed in connect with his vendors who had forecasted increases and that he factored that into his bid. He stated he submitted a proposal to Respondent in March 2022 and did the work that month but did not testify if there was any increase in his March 2022 proposal.
18. As herein relevant to the Citation, Ramon Torrez, the HVAC subcontractor on the project, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that he had installed all the internal HVAC components to the room addition but had yet to install the heat pump. He stated that he had completed his work with regard to the laundry room by adding the dryer vent and reinstalling the unit for a total price of $1,600 to $1,800, of which $600 to $700 was for the dryer vent. He further testified that his costs were increasing during the project but he did not testify whether he passed any increased costs on to Respondent.
19. As herein relevant to the Citation, John Acuna, the stucco subcontractor on the project, testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of Respondent that he was hired to do the drywall and the paint and texture on the project. He stated he originally bid the entire structure, then rebid just half the project that included the living area and laundry room and a couple of walls in garage and was paid in full by Respondent that included all texturing but no painting. He further testified that his material prices went up 30 - 40 per cent, but did not remember how much he increased the price to Respondent nor was he specific as to the time period of that increase.
20. Administrative notice is taken of Respondent’s prior license record which reflects that Respondent’s License No. 153006 was first issued on May 4, 2000. Such prior license record also reflects that there were no other disciplinary actions imposed against Respondent’s license.
.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Registrar has jurisdiction over this matter, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-1101, et seq., which authorizes the Registrar to impose disciplinary sanctions against licenses for violations of A.R.S. § 32-1154.
2. The burden of proof at an administrative hearing falls to the party asserting a claim, right, or entitlement and the standard of proof on all issues in these matters is by preponderance of the evidence. See Arizona Administrative Code Rule 2-19-119.
3. To warrant such sanctions by the Registrar, Complainant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the statutory section cited. Proof by a “preponderance” means that “the evidence is sufficient to persuade the finder of fact that the proposition is more likely true than not.” In re: Arnold and Baker Farms, 177 B.R. 648 (9th Cir. BAP (Ariz.) 1994). See also Culpepper v. State of Arizona, 187 Ariz. 431, 930 P.2d 508 (App. 1996). It is “evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (Rev. 6th ed. 1990).
4. A.R.S. § 32-1154(A) includes in pertinent part among the grounds for suspension, revocation, or other disciplinary action against a contractor’s license, any of the following acts:
...
3. Violation of any rule adopted by the registrar.
...
8. Failure in a material respect by the licensee to complete a construction project or operation for the price stated in the contract, or in any modification of the contract.
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12. Failure in any material respect to comply with this chapter.
...
5. With regard to the “violation of any rule adopted by the registrar” under A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(3) referenced in the Citation, the rule allegedly violated in this case is Arizona Administrative Code Rule 4-9-108(A) which requires that “[a] contractor shall perform all work in a professional and workmanlike manner.”
6. With regard to the “failure in a material respect to comply with this chapter [Chapter 10 of Title 32 the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S. § 32-1101 et seq.)]” referenced in the Citation, A.R.S. § 32-1158(A) in Chapter 10 requires in pertinent part that any contract in an amount of more than one thousand dollars entered into between a contractor and the owner of a property to be improved shall contain in writing at least the following nine items:
1. The name of the contractor and the contractor's business address and license number.
2. The name and mailing address of the owner and the jobsite address or legal description.
3. The date the parties entered into the contract.
4. The estimated date of completion of all work to be performed under the contract.
5. A description of the work to be performed under the contract.
6. The total dollar amount to be paid to the contractor by the owner for all work to be performed under the contract, including all applicable taxes.
7. The dollar amount of any advance deposit paid or scheduled to be paid to the contractor by the owner.
8. The dollar amount of any progress payment and the stage of construction at which the contractor will be entitled to collect progress payments during the course of construction under the contract.
9. That the property owner has the right to file a written complaint with the registrar for an alleged violation of section 32-1154, subsection A. The contract shall contain the registrar's telephone number and website address and shall state that complaints must be made within the applicable time period as set forth in section 32-1155, subsection A. The information in this paragraph must be prominently displayed in the contract in at least ten point bold type, and the contract shall be signed by the property owner and the contractor or the contractor's designated representative....
7. A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(3). The Tribunal finds no violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(3) relating to Arizona Administrative Code Rule 4-9-108(a) that warrants discipline. The Investigator did not note any deficient work of Respondent in the Directive. Rather, in citing in this regard, the Investigator testified that Respondent’s failure to perform work in a professional and workmanlike manner was its failure to complete the construction project for the price stated in the contract, also a violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(8), which is discussed below. However, the Tribunal does not believe it was the intent of the Legislature to have the failure to complete work, at least under all circumstances, to also constitute a failure to perform work in a professional or workmanlike manner. If that were the case, virtually every ground listed under A.R.S. § 32-1154 arguably would also constitute a failure to perform work in a professional and workmanlike manner. The Tribunal does not find this case to be one which in which the failure to complete work was also a failure to perform work in a professional and workmanlike manner, and therefore finds no cause for discipline under A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(3).
8. A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(8). Complainant has presented sufficient evidence to establish that Respondent failed in a material respect to complete a construction project for the price stated in the contract with Complainant, or in any modification of that contract, in violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(8). There was no dispute that Respondent could not and was not willing to perform on the contract for the original contract price and that a material amount of work was yet to be completed. Respondent requested an additional payment of $81,493.71 on July 13, 2022, a payment not required under the contract, for additional work which notably did not include such items to complete the contract as painting, flooring, doors and trim. (Respondent’s Exhibit 1).
As a threshold matter, a determination is necessary to determine the price stated in the contract with any modifications. Complainant argued that the contract price is the price stated in the contract; Respondent argued the contract price increased due to add-ons, preliminary Phase 2 work, and price increases from subcontractors. While it is clear there were add-ons and that Respondent performed preliminary work on Phase 2, it also clear that Respondent refused to complete Phase 1 for the $250,000.00 contract price. There was insufficient evidence presented to show that the original contract price for Phase 1 increased substantially due to add-ons or some preliminary Phase 2 work. With regard to add-ons, the evidence reflected some modifications, moving the closets (no charge by subcontractor), application of pop-outs ($1,500 charged by subcontractor) and a change in the garage door opening (no evidence of increase in price), but these items do not reflect a significant increase in the contract price or that these items were not in fact paid for by Complainant with his extra payment of $34,257.14 to Respondent outside of the contract. (Complainant’s Exhibit F). Further, there was insufficient evidence present to reconcile how much preliminary work Respondent performed on Phase 2. Unfortunately, Respondent’s invoice/proposal for the laundry room does not delineate the value of the work performed or to be performed. (Respondent’s Exhibit 1). As there was insufficient evidence presented to determine the precise amount Phase 1 increased due to add-ons and preliminary Phase 2 work, the Tribunal in any event does not consider it to be an amount of significance.
It is apparent that non-payment for the add-ons or the preliminary Phase 2 work was not the cause of Respondent’s refusal to continue work without further payment. Respondent’s primary contention is that it could not complete the work for the contract price because costs increased because all of Respondent’s subcontractors passed on their increased costs to Respondent. While the Tribunal suspects there were in fact price increases, this was not shown to be the case by the preponderance of the evidence. The testimony of the subcontractors established they encountered price increases over an unspecified period of time, but none of them testified whether or to what extent they passed that increase on to Respondent. This could have been substantiated by simply submitting their original bids and their subsequent bids/invoices to show the difference, but no such evidence was offered. Respondent’s budgets, created after this proceeding commenced and which lacked backup documentation, was a less than persuasive job accounting for the project. (Respondent’s Exhibit 9, 10), Indeed, as argued by Complainant, it showed that the cost of the project was $204,575.84 to date, (Respondent’s Exhibit 10), while Respondent had paid $241,647.90 to date for the work, which included his payments directly to subcontractors for work on the contract. Thus, according to Respondent’s accounting, Complainant had overpaid in excess of $37,000.00, which Respondent could not account for.
Given that Respondent’s refusal to perform the contract for the original contract price was not seriously in dispute, the question presented is whether there is a defense for such a refusal. Notably, this prohibition in A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(8) regarding refusal to complete a construction project does not include an expressed defense such as in other grounds for suspension, for example, A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(1) (abandonment or refusing to perform work “without legal excuse”); A.R.S. 32-1154(a)(22) (failure to take appropriate corrective action “without valid justification”). Whether legal excuse, valid justification, or any other defense is available to a refusal to complete a construction project for the price stated in the contract may be open to question, Respondent argues the common law contract doctrine of impossibility of performance for refusing to complete the project. It is not clear whether Respondent claims it was impossible to complete the work for the contract price, or whether it was just impossible to complete the work. However, it is manifest that it was not objectively impossible to complete the contract, perhaps economically unfeasible for Respondent, but not impossible. Rather, the common law theory Respondent may have argued is that it was commercially impracticable to complete the job for the original contract price. The Arizona jury instructions with regard to civil actions in contract are instructive on the law of commercial impracticability:
A party can be excused from performing the contract if that performance became impracticable after the contract was made due to circumstances beyond the party’s control.
“Impracticable” means extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to the party claiming it. This means something more than that the performance would have been somewhat more difficult or costly. On the other hand, it does not mean that performance was absolutely impossible.
The occurrence of a reasonably foreseeable event cannot render performance impracticable. In determining whether an event was reasonably foreseeable, you may consider the contract itself and the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.
RAJI (Civil) 7th, No. 29.
Even if common law defenses were available in this proceeding, Respondent has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it was commercially impracticable to complete the work. Extreme and unreasonable difficulty or expense may have been experienced by Respondent in proceeding with the contract, but there was no evidence presented of such other than Respondent’s statement that it was impossible. As to foreseeability, the Tribunal does not consider the claimed price increases to be unforeseeable. The determinative date for foreseeability was January 6, 2022, the date of the signing of the contract. Presumably all subcontractor bids were submitted to Respondent prior to that date, and it was its responsibility to determine whether those bids were still in effect on that date. By January 2022, supply shortages were prevalent, the pandemic was no longer a new phenomenon, and an increase in the inflation rate was well underway and therefore price increases were not unforeseeable.
In considering the contract to determine whether price increases were foreseeable, it does not appear that Respondent was completely unaware of potential cost increases. In that it seemingly contemplated that Phase 2 of the work might not start immediately, Respondent included a term in the contract for Phase 2 that “Pricing not guaranteed after 90 days,” (Complainant’s Exhibit E), which was something in the nature of a price escalation clause, a contract term that is not uncommon in construction contracts to protect against the very risk that materialized in this case. In essence, Respondent passed the risk of increased prices after 90 days onto Complainant for Phase 2, but chose not to include any contract language regarding price increases in Phase 1, and thus did not pass that risk of increases on to Complainant for Phase 1.
Further, as between Complainant and Respondent, Respondent was in the better position to protect against price increases. Upon the signing of the contract. Complainant was required to pay $125,000.00, 50 percent of the Phase 1 contract amount to “order materials and parts due to supply lead times.” (Complainant’s Exhibit E). Presumably, such a substantial payment would have been sufficient to lock in subcontractor’s bids and material orders with deposits, which is what it was expressly intended to do. However, Respondent presented no evidence to show that it did just that to minimize the risk of price increases, or accounted for those funds in any way to show why it did not. Accordingly, in that the defense of commercial impracticability would not be available to Respondent in a civil case, the Tribunal finds that Respondent has not presented a viable defense for its failure to complete the work for the contract price.
9. A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(12). The Tribunal finds no violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(12) that warrants discipline. The evidence reflected that Respondent failed to comply with A.R.S. § 32-1158(A) with regard to the required contents of the contract with Complainant due to the lack of Respondent’s license number, an estimated completion date, and a notice of the right to file a complaint with Registrar. However, Respondent submitted a new form contract to the Registrar during the course of this proceeding that complied with A.R.S. § 32-1158(A), the submission of which the Registrar considers to be a remedy of this violation. Therefore, the Tribunal finds no cause for discipline in this regard.
10. In conclusion, the Tribunal finds that Complainant has presented sufficient evidence to established cause to discipline Respondent’s license for a violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(8).
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that on the effective date of this Order, Fraire Custom Builders, LLC’s, License Number 153006 is suspended for five (5) days.
Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(I), the licensee may accept the Administrative Law Judge Decision by advising the Office of Administrative Hearings in writing not more than ten (10) days after receiving the decision. If the licensee accepts the Administrative Law Judge Decision, the decision shall be certified as the final decision by the Office of Administrative Hearings.
In the event of certification of the Administrative Law Judge Decision by the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings, the effective date of the Order will be forty (40) days from the date of that certification.
Done this day, March 6, 2023.
/s/ Roger Geddes
Administrative Law Judge
Transmitted electronically to:
Martín Quezada, Director
Registrar of Contractors
Complainant
Lawrence Tiffin
7301 S Placita de Cordorniz
Tucson, AZ 85747
[email redacted]
Respondent(s)
Fraire Custom Builders LLC
926 W Prince Rd
Tucson, AZ 85705
Jeanna M.W. Chandler, Esq.
4801 E Broadway Blvd., Suite 400
Tucson, AZ 85711-3638
[email redacted]
By: OAH Staff