ALJDEC decisions subject to certification as final
2017A-900-CHC-ROC · Registrar of Contractors · 2017-06-22
IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Debra Lee LaPrade,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
Alonso Arana Sandoval DBA: C and S Drywall, License No: 231014,
RESPONDENT.
No. 2017A-900-CHC-ROC
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
HEARING: June 14, 2017
APPEARANCES: Complainant Debra Lee LaPrade appeared on her own behalf. Alonso Arana Sandoval dba C and S Drywall appeared on his own behalf.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Suzanne Marwil
_____________________________________________________________________
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Arizona Registrar of Contractors (“the Registrar”) first issued License No. 231014 to Alonso Arana Sandoval dba C and S Drywall (“Respondent”) on March 18, 2007. This license was class CR 10 for Drywall. This license has been inactive since April 3, 2017 when it was apparently suspended for nonrenewal.
On February 15, 2017, the Registrar received a Complaint against Respondent from Debra Lee LaPrade (“Complainant”) alleging that Respondent had failed to complete the interior of her home in plaster as contracted, had used the wrong material, left the job half complete, and been paid a $24,500.00 of the $35,000.00 contract price.
The Registrar assigned Matt Gunstra to investigate that Complaint. On March 13, 2017, Gunstra conducted a jobsite inspection. Respondent did not attend, despite being notified of the inspection. Gunstra substantiated abandonment because the work was not even half done and Complainant advised that Respondent had not returned in months. Gunstra also substantiated deviation from the contract, which called for plaster given that joint compound was used. He observed that two different products were used, raising workmanship issues. Gunstra also noted other workmanship issues including, major cracks, shrinking of the product, wavy corners, poorly done patches and metal lathe showing.
Gunstra documented a regulatory issue of Respondent working outside his license in that the use of plaster as contracted for by Respondent requires a CR 36 license and is outside the scope of a CR10 Drywall license.
On March 21, 2017, Gunstra issued a Directive requiring Respondent to complete the work as contracted in a workmanlike manner. Gunstra noted in the Directive that because doing the corrective work was beyond the scope of Respondent’s license, Respondent could not do the work, but instead had to hire a licensed contractor to do so or reach a financial settlement with Complainant by the close of business on April 4, 2017.
Respondent contacted Complainant after receiving the Directive and said he would not settle so Gunstra forwarded the file to the Registrar’s legal department for review.
The Registrar issued a Citation and Complaint against Respondent, charging possible violations of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(1), A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(2), A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(3), A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(16), and A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(22).
Respondent filed a timely written answer to the Citation, claiming that he had run out of money to complete the job for Complainant and asking for a hearing to review Complainant’s allegations.
The Registrar referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), an independent state agency, for an evidentiary hearing.
The Registrar issued a Notice of Hearing, setting a hearing at OAH on June 14, 2017.
Complainant testified that Roberto Melendrez, Respondent’s salesman/employee, came to her door with an advertisement and business card claiming that the Respondent could do Venetian plaster on the interior home for a total cost of $35,000.00. Although she paid half the money upfront and then advanced more to keep the crew working despite her concerns that they were using the wrong product, Respondent informed her on February 10, 2017 that he would not finish the job because he had run out of money. Complainant then filed the Complaint. During the Directive period, Complainant telephoned Respondent to discuss the possibility of a financial settlement, but was told that Respondent would not pay her a cent and would declare bankruptcy.
Respondent testified and agreed that he did not finish the job and had knowingly worked beyond the scope of his license in doing interior plaster. He acknowledged that he had done two or three other jobs using Venetian plaster. He attempted to blame other people for having unreasonable expectations of what could be done for the money and for not telling him what was within the scope of his own license. Respondent believed that because he had spent all the money Complainant had given him working on her project, he had done all he could to comply with the Directive.
Gunstra testified consistently with the facts detailed above and noted that Respondent had explicitly advertised for work that was beyond the scope of his license.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This matter lies within the Registrar’s jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 32-1101 et seq.
2. Respondent’s inactive license does not deprive Complainant of her right to prosecute his complaint or prevent the Registrar from determining the merits of the complaint. See A.R.S. § 32-1154(D).
4. Complainant bears the burden of proof to establish Respondent’s statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1); see also Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952). “A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5 (1960).
5. Complainant established that Respondent abandoned the contract or refused to perform after submitting a bid on work without legal excuse for the abandonment or refusal in violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(1).
6. Complainant proved that Respondent departed from the parties’ contract by failing to apply interior plaster and using a joint compound instead. Therefore, Complainant established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(2).
7. Undisputed credible testimony established Respondent did work of questionable quality in Respondent’s home, including using two different products, major cracks, shrinking of the product, wavy corners, poorly done patches and metal lathe showing through. Thus, Complainant established Respondent’s work on the items included in the Directive was not done in a professional and workmanlike manner in violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(3), namely A.A.C. R4-9-108.
8. The undisputed evidence at hearing established that Respondent contracted to use interior plaster which was beyond the scope of its drywall license. Therefore, Complainant established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(16).
9. The evidence showed that Respondent refused to discuss a financial settlement during the Directive period and never attempted to comply with the Directive in violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(22).
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that on the effective date of the Order, the Registrar shall revoke Respondent’s License No. 231014.
In the event of certification of the Administrative Law Judge Decision by the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings, the effective date of the Order will be 40 days from the date of that certification.
Done this day, June 22, 2017.
/s/ Suzanne Marwil
Administrative Law Judge
Transmitted electronically to:
Jeffrey Fleetham, Director
Registrar of Contractors